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COMMUNICATING DISAGREEMENT 
BEHIND THE BENCH: THE IMPORTANCE 
OF RULES AND NORMS OF AN 
APPELLATE COURT 
RENEE COHN JUBELIRER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellate court judges typically decide the appeals before them as a group. 
This collective decision-making process is presumed to improve the quality of the 
decisions in terms of accuracy and consistency. The appellate design assumes that 
judges working together will communicate and consider different points of view, 
which increases the probability of reaching a better decision than would a single 
judge. The design makes assumptions regarding the different points of view that 
the judges bring to the process, their willingness to share and to consider different 
points of view, and the ways the judges will address disagreement. The nature of 
the true interaction between judges is a critical determinant of whether the 
assumptions underlying the presumed benefits of collective judicial decision-
making are accurate. 
Judicial decision-making has a social dimension. Communication among the 
judges throughout the process of drafting and issuing an opinion occurs “behind 
the bench”. These communications are formally structured by procedural rules. 
Less understood are a court’s norms, or “informal rules that specify certain 
behaviors as appropriate or inappropriate for individuals who occupy roles within 
a social institution,” including customs and traditions.1 Developed over time, 
norms also structure judges’ expectations and interactions with each other. Rules 
and norms vary between courts, and so does the nature of judges’ interactions 
with each other. Understanding the interactions between judges is critical to 
understanding the collective decision-making process of a multimember court, as 
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 1.  VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 39 (2006) (citing Thomas 
G. Walker, Professor of Political Sci., Emory Univ., Presentation at the Conference on the Scientific 
Study of Judicial Politics, The Role of Norms in Institutional Evolution, Maintenance and Change, at 2 
(1997)). 
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is understanding the effect of the court’s rules and norms on those interactions. 
Because fully understanding the effect of these rules and norms from outside that 
court is difficult, it can be particularly helpful for judges to look behind the bench 
and within their court.2 
In this article, I examine the rules and norms of the appellate court on which 
I sit and their effect on the interactions between the judges, particularly with 
regard to communicating and addressing different points of view. My study of the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania supports the notion that a court’s rules 
and norms affect the communication of disagreement and that certain rules and 
norms can reduce costs of disagreement and increase the benefits of the collective 
decision-making process. 
The rules and norms of the Commonwealth Court encourage judges to 
communicate respectful disagreement formally and informally within an internal 
structure that promotes a collaborative process in which judges consider other 
views. Communicating different points of view internally—as opposed to the 
filing of minority opinions outside the court—is structured with a sliding scale of 
effort that relates to the importance of the disagreement to each judge; thus, the 
internal communication of disagreement can involve minimal effort costs. By 
custom, judges are expected to voice their different points of view, promoting 
sincere consideration of different perspectives without affecting collegial 
relationships. Every judge votes on every case, which increases the judges’ effort 
costs while also increasing the probability of achieving a correct decision, 
consistent with precedent, and reduces the influence of individual bias. The 
judges find the extra costs are worth the perceived benefits. 
Part II of this article describes the benefits and costs of appellate group 
decision-making and the importance of rules and norms in affecting judges’ 
decision-making. In Part III, I study the unique institutional rules and norms of 
the Commonwealth Court, incorporating interviews with the other judges on the 
court and empirical data, which supports the importance of the institutional 
structure on decision-making. 
II 
DECISION-MAKING ON A MULTIMEMBER COURT 
Intermediate appellate court judges typically decide the merits of an appeal 
as one of a panel of three or more judges. Courts are structured so that a larger 
number of judges sit together to decide cases as you travel up the judicial 
hierarchy, and the cases become more difficult, controversial, or important. 
Reaching a final decision3 requires the judges to interact in a group process,4 
 
 2.  Marsha S. Berzon, Dissent, “Dissentals,” and Decision Making, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1479 (2012). 
 3.  For this article, I focus on reported or unreported opinions that resolve the issues before the 
court by setting out the facts and applying the law to those facts with the court’s legal 
analysis/explanation. For a discussion of why judges may not want to provide reasons for decisions, see 
Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not To Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach, 72 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483 (2015).  
 4.  Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 82 (1986).  
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giving the work a social dimension. This multimember design is “specifically 
structured to promote a collaborative form of decision making,” which 
presumably improves the quality of decisions and opinions.5 
A. The Deliberative Process 
A number of assumptions underlie the presumption that increasing the 
number of judges deciding a case improves the quality of decisions, including: 1) 
there will be diversity of opinion and ideas; 2) judges will express their diverse 
ideas to each other; 3) judges will listen to and consider ideas and opinions that 
differ from their own; 4) considering these different perspectives will increase the 
probability of reaching a correct decision;6 and 5) the opportunity for judges to 
express their disagreement publicly through a separate opinion will cause other 
judges to consider the disagreement seriously. 
These assumptions appear to be based on the belief that judges reach their 
decision pursuant to a deliberative process of “dialogue, persuasion and 
revision.”7 When there is disagreement, the deliberative explanation of decision-
making assumes that internal exchanges will occur among judges who vote and 
that these exchanges will influence how they vote.8 When these internal 
exchanges occur between judges with diverse backgrounds and experiences, the 
judges have the opportunity to consider a wider range of perspectives than would 
a panel of like-minded judges. Viewing judicial decision-making as a deliberative 
process, the presence or absence of diversity on a panel would have 
“informational or deliberative consequences.”9 The theory is that even a single 
judge with a different perspective can have influence over the outcome, as long 
as other judges will consider that perspective. 
This deliberative process is utilized by a collegial court as defined by Harry 
Edwards. Judicial collegiality is a “process that helps to create the conditions for 
principled agreement, by allowing all points of view to be aired and considered.”10 
A slightly different way of thinking of the deliberative process is “adversarial 
collaboration,” meaning “working with those with whom you disagree.”11 When 
social scientists who have different theories work together with the goal of 
publishing joint research, they stringently test the other party’s theories and 
 
 5.  Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical 
Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1321 (2013); see also HETTINGER, supra note 1, at 
1. 
 6.  Kim, supra note 5, at 1321 (citing Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 98); see also Kevin M. Quinn, The 
Academic Study of Decision Making on Multimember Courts, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1493, 1496 (2012) 
(“increasing the size of the multimember court increases collective accuracy, all else being equal”).  
 7.  Kim, supra note 5, at 1321 (citing Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial 
Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1656 (2003)).  
 8.  Id. at 1325. 
 9.  Quinn, supra note 6, at 1498; Kim, supra note 5, at 1325.  
 10.  Edwards, supra note 7, at 1644. 
 11.  Berzon, supra note 2, at 1481, 1484 (citing Daniel Kahneman, Experiences of Collaborative 
Research, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 723, 729–30 (2003)).  
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results, subjecting them to a “test that the other party expects [] to fail.”12 This 
process can also ameliorate trait and cognitive biases. Although adversarial 
collaboration may not lead to agreement, Berzon posits that the process 
“generates better data, reaches sounder conclusions, and garners more 
legitimacy.”13 Whether the deliberative process consists of collegial deliberation 
or adversarial collaboration, the process requires colleagues or “adversaries” 
with different views to communicate those views, and receptive judges to listen 
to them. 
That judges have differences of opinion and viewpoints when deciding cases 
is not surprising. While many theories aim to explain the source of these 
differences, judges are human and, therefore, may be influenced by 
temperament, background, personal and professional experiences, 
characteristics of personal identity, ideology, or other factors.14 However, that 
does not mean that judges, “when they don their robes,” do not want to be 
independent and “set aside their passions, prejudices and interests and follow the 
law.”15 The assumption is that a deliberative process can “play[] an important 
part in mitigating the role of partisan politics and personal ideology by allowing 
judges of differing perspectives and philosophies to communicate with, listen to, 
and ultimately influence one another in constructive and law-abiding ways.”16 In 
summary, more input and alternative points of view provide a moderating or 
constraining influence on arbitrary decision-making. 
B. Communicating Different Points of View 
Judges can communicate different viewpoints both internally, to the other 
judges on their court, and externally, to the parties and public. Although 
sometimes conflated under the general topic of dissent, it is helpful to separately 
consider the process through which judges communicate different viewpoints 
internally from the product of the deliberative process, which is an externally-
 
 12.  Id. at 1485.  
 13.  Id. 
 14.  David Levi stated “most judges are more than aware that they are ‘making law,’ in the sense of 
amplifying it, when they apply precedents or statutory language to particular factual settings.” David F. 
Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791, 1795–96 (2009). He also contends “that most judges, 
particularly the very best ones, are acutely aware of the potential of personal factors, including judicial 
philosophy, life experience, and personality, to affect how judges approach and then decide legal issues.” 
Id.  
 15.  Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 191, 
192 (2012).  
 16.  Edwards, supra note 7. See also Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical 
Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 
(2009); Frank B. Cross, Collegial Ideology in the Courts, Review Essay, 103 NW. U. L. Rev. 1399 (2009) 
(reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL (2006) and HETTINGER, supra note 1); 
Francis P. O’Connor, The Art of Collegiality: Creating Consensus and Coping with Dissent, 83 MASS. L. 
REV. 93 (1998); Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2298 (1999). 
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issued ruling.17 The reasons for each differ, as do the incentives, benefits, and 
costs. 
Internal communication, including voting, can be oral or written, on paper or 
electronic, informal or formal. Depending on the court, voting can occur at 
conferences after the cases are argued, after a draft opinion is circulated, with or 
without extended discussion, and with various opportunity to subsequently 
change the vote. There may be additional discussion in memoranda and emails. 
Judges can also circulate minority opinions such as dissents and concurrences. If 
effective, a minority viewpoint can become the majority position.18 In addition to 
potentially persuading the other panel judges, disagreement expressed internally 
can, on some courts, cause non-panel judges to want to review the opinion to 
decide whether a larger group of judges should review the case through en banc 
review, or whether rehearing or reargument should be granted. 
Not wanting to be reversed by a higher court or publicly embarrassed, a panel 
majority that might otherwise wish to deviate from precedent or existing legal 
authority may moderate their views to avoid the threat of a public dissent, also 
referred to as a “whistleblower hypothesis.”19 The possibility of separate opinions 
“is the leverage required to ensure that each judge takes seriously the critiques 
of the others,” which “improves the internal decision-making process and 
therefore the quality of . . . dispositions, regardless of whether the dispositions 
are ultimately rendered unanimously.”20 
However, collaborating with a group increases the effort costs of judges. It 
can take more time and effort to consider and evaluate another point of view, as 
well as to express disagreement. As caseloads increase, the costs of disagreement 
also increase. The social fabric of the court and the interrelationships between 
the judges can be adversely affected where communication of disagreement 
creates tension among members of the court or a judge loses credibility by over-
disagreement.21 This can occur at different points during the decision-making 
process, and some of these costs are greater when a dissenting opinion is written 
and publicly filed. 
The product of the decision-making process is a decision issued outside of the 
court. This decision can be one unanimous majority opinion or a majority with 
minority opinions expressing differing viewpoints. Much has been written about 
 
 17.  See Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, Ten Theses on Dissent, 67 U. TORONTO L.J. 156 
(2017).  
 18.  Peter W. Hogg & Ravi Amarnath, Why Judges Should Dissent, 67 U. TORONTO L. J. 126, 139 
(2017) (citing Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 19 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 33, 41–42 (1994) (expression 
of disagreement will be more fully and forcefully developed in a dissenting or concurring opinion as 
opposed to memos or oral communication)). 
 19.  Richard Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of 
Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1112 (2011) (citing Frank B. 
Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156 (1998)).  
 20.  Berzon, supra note 2, at 1486.  
 21.  Id. at 1462.  
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dissenting opinions. Some general benefits of dissenting opinions are that they 
can inspire the unsuccessful party to appeal; a reviewing court to adopt the 
dissenting position, which may enhance the reputation of the dissenting judge as 
having written an influential dissent;22 elected officials to address the issue; and 
future litigants to craft arguments that might be more successful. On the other 
hand, it takes more effort for a judge to draft a dissenting opinion than informal, 
internal objections. Public disagreement may also more negatively affect the 
collegial relationships between the judges. 
Fundamental philosophical and jurisprudential considerations underlie 
whether to write dissents. Different viewpoints publicly expressed have the 
potential of politicizing the court, meaning cases appear to be decided on a 
political, not legal, basis. Public disagreement can create indeterminacy and 
uncertainty in the law. The prestige of the court can be adversely affected. These 
reasons apparently motivated Chief Justice Marshall to begin a “consensus 
norm” on the Supreme Court, encouraging judicial compromise so that one 
unanimous majority opinion could be issued instead of multiple individual 
opinions.23 Over time, “the propriety of the dissenting opinion . . . was one of the 
‘longest and ‘liveliest’ institutional debates in American legal history.”24 The 
consensus norm ultimately collapsed, and today dissents are not unusual. 
The concepts of individual judicial responsibility to decide cases, and the 
independence of judges to fulfill this responsibility, may be in tension with the 
constraints placed upon judicial decision-making. The judicial duty can be viewed 
as requiring more than simply adjudicating specific factual disputes, such as 
elucidating the law.25 All judges vote on their assigned cases.26 But, as part of that 
duty and a commitment to judicial independence, is there a responsibility to 
dissent if a judge disagrees?27 Some argue dissenting may both “promote 
individual judicial responsibility and demonstrate transparency as to how a 
decision was reached by a panel of judges.”28 Conversely, a recent proposal 
 
 22.  LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 256 (2013) (“The main 
benefits of dissenting thus derive from the influence of the dissenting opinion, and, a closely related point, 
the enhanced reputation of the judge who writes the dissent.”). 
 23.  Note, From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the “Respectful” Dissent, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1305 (March 2011). See also William H. Pryor, Jr., The Perspective of a Junior Circuit Judge on 
Judicial Modesty, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1007, 1016–17 (2008) (noting that “clarity was a goal” for Chief Justice 
Marshall, who angered Thomas Jefferson as the Court continued to issue unanimous pro-federal opinions 
written by Marshall even after Jefferson and Madison had appointed a majority of justices).  
 24.  Id. at 1309. One commentator “thought dissents ‘entertaining’ but ultimately ‘as useless as 
‘sassing’ the umpire of a baseball game.’” Id. (quoting Walter Stager, Dissenting Opinions – Their 
Purpose and Results, 19 ILL. L. REV. 604, 607 (1925)). 
 25.  Hogg & Amarnath, supra note 18, at 129–130. 
 26.  Tonja Jacobi & Eugene Kontorovich, Why Judges Always Vote, 43 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 190 
(2015). 
 27.  Bernice B. Donald, The Intrajudicial Factor in Judicial Independence: Reflections on Collegiality 
and Dissent in Multi-Member Courts, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 1123 (2017). 
 28.  Hogg & Amarnath, supra note 18, at 126. See also Belleau & Johnson, supra note 17, at 156 
(noting that the public ought to “attend to judicial dissent in order to engage with the ways that our 
COHN JUBELIRER - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2019  5:04 PM 
No. 2 2019] COMMUNICATING DISAGREEMENT BEHIND THE BENCH 109 
suggests that “judges pause to consider when and why it makes sense to consider 
their colleagues’ votes, as opposed to indulging themselves in solipsistic decision 
making.”29 Communicating disagreement internally might satisfy a judge’s 
individual judicial responsibility, even if a dissenting opinion is not publicly filed. 
In sum, societal and judicial expectations have changed over time as various 
factors have weighed more or less heavily for the individual judge, the court as a 
whole, and the legal system. These changes have also changed judicial behavior. 
So, while a level of disagreement is critical to an unbiased and thoughtful 
appellate decision,30 there are also costs arising out of this process. These costs 
vary depending on whether the disagreement was communicated internally or 
externally and the manner of communication. Although appellate courts 
presumably foster a deliberative, collegial decision-making process, that 
presumption may be inaccurate where the costs of the process are too great or 
the perceived benefits insufficient. 
 C. To Agree or Disagree—Other Considerations 
In their comprehensive study, “The Behavior of Federal Judges,” Epstein et 
al. conclude that the time, effort, and social costs of communicating and 
considering different views make it unlikely that such deliberation occurs in the 
courts. They model the judge as a rational actor making choices in a labor 
market.31 This model, called the judicial utility function, posits that judges 
are motivated and constrained, as other workers are, by costs and benefits both 
pecuniary and nonpecuniary, but mainly the latter: nonpecuniary costs such as effort, 
criticism, and workplace tensions, nonpecuniary benefits such as leisure, esteem, 
influence, self-expression, celebrity (that is, being a public figure), and opportunities for 
appointment to a higher court; and constrained also by professional and institutional 
rules and expectations and by a ‘production function’—the tools and methods that the 
worker uses in his job and how he uses them.32 
The authors make assumptions regarding the effect of diversity on panels, 
which are very different from the assumptions with which we began. While the 
authors agree that the more heterogeneous or diverse a panel, the less likely 
judges are to think alike and be predisposed to agree with each other, the authors 
do not believe the judges will communicate their disagreement. Instead, they 
assume that a judge who is in the minority, either in a panel or on the court as a 
whole, will want to go along with the majority, which they call “conformity.”33 
 
system of justice operates, renews itself, and changes”).  
 29.  Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Votes of Other Judges, 105 GEO. L.J. 159, 189 (2016). 
See also Hogg & Amarnath, supra note 18, at 133–134 (citing Diane P. Wood, When to Hold, When to 
Fold, and When to Reshuffle: The Art of Decisionmaking on a Multi-Member Court, 100 CAL. L. REV. 
1445, 1463–73 (2012) (proposing a norm that judges stop and consider under what grounds a dissent can 
be justified)). 
 30.  See, e.g., Wood, supra note 29, at 1447 n.9 (listing articles discussing the costs and benefits of 
dissenting).  
 31.  EPSTEIN, supra note 22. 
 32.  Id. at 5.  
 33.  Id. at 144–145, 154. 
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They attribute unanimous decisions to dissent aversion, arising from the costs of 
disagreement. These costs are both the expenditure of effort to articulate this 
disagreement (effort aversion) and the social costs of disagreement, which 
involve the relationships with the other judges and the fear that disagreement will 
cause other judges to disagree with their majority opinions, creating more effort 
costs. Judges will instead go along to get along. They also discount the assumption 
that judges will sincerely consider different opinions, particularly ideological 
disagreements, which are more difficult to resolve by discussion or compromise, 
“being rooted more in values, experience, personal-identity characteristics, and 
temperament than in beliefs based on objectively verifiable facts, and, for most 
judges, being more important.”34 Moreover, “once a judge casts even a tentative 
vote he may fear loss of face if he allows his mind to be changed by another judge 
at the conference.”35 Because judges do not choose their colleagues, the authors 
assume that what a judge’s colleagues say or think has little influence on how that 
judge votes and were surprised that even when there is a majority on the panel, 
the judges have a tendency to bend in the direction of a judge with a different 
ideology—which they refer to as a “wobbler effect.”36 It follows that, for these 
authors, “judicial deliberations are overrated,”37 and there is “less deliberation 
among judges, at least in the common understanding of the word, than outsiders 
assume . . . .”38 In their view, unanimous opinions may reflect not agreement 
through a deliberative or collaborative process, but a determination that the costs 
of engaging in that process are too high to justify communication of that 
disagreement. In this situation, the multimember decision-making process may 
not achieve benefits that require willingness to communicate and consider 
different points of view. 
Other studies have found that panel composition may influence the votes of 
the judges.39 For example, a study of United States D.C. Circuit cases involving 
challenges to Environmental Protection Agency determinations found that “the 
ideology of one’s colleagues is a better predictor of one’s vote than one’s own 
ideology.”40 Studies have also suggested the existence of gender-based and race-
based panel effects in specific types of cases.41 
 
 34.  Id. at 329.  
 35.  Id. at 309. The authors posit that a judge might not dissent “because of fear of retaliation,” 
although without supporting empirical data. Id. at 207.  
 36.  Id. at 192. 
 37.  Id. at 390.  
 38.  Id. at 272. 
 39.  Kim, supra note 5, at 1322.  
 40.  Revesz, supra note 19, at 1764. In Revesz’s study, he, as does Epstein, et al., focused on political 
partisanship, meaning the influence of the ideological leanings of judges or justices on their colleagues.  
 41.  See Quinn, supra note 6, at 1498 (citing Christina Boyd et al., Untangling the Casual Effects of 
Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 403 (2010)); Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: 
Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 (2005); 
Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI., 
33–35 (2012). 
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If judges do not consider different viewpoints, there can be little question that 
the costs of communicating those views would outweigh any benefit. Focusing 
only on the external communication of disagreement, the benefit of a dissenting 
opinion for Epstein, et al., is whether it will be cited by other courts. Their study 
finds little citation to dissenting opinions of federal judges on the courts of 
appeals, which means there is “little payoff to a court of appeals judge from 
writing a dissent—the influence of his dissent, at least as proxied by citations to 
it, is likely to be zero.”42 They believe this also helps to explain the low dissent 
rate. 
However, it is also possible that panel effects can be attributed to the 
“dynamics internal to the members of a panel.”43 Are there reasons that some 
judges may engage in a collegial deliberative process and communicate 
disagreement, while the costs of such deliberations are too high for others? If so, 
can we identify “mechanisms that foster effective decisionmaking?”44 Is it always 
too costly, or are there some courts in which the benefits can still incentivize 
judges to communicate and consider disagreement? Otherwise, instead of a 
group of judges, it would be as beneficial and less costly to have a single judge 
with many clerks make the decision. 
D. Institutional Context of Judicial Decision-Making 
Just as judges are different, the courts on which they sit also are different. The 
procedural rules and the internal operating procedures vary between courts, and 
the historic traditions and culture of the court will have developed in very 
different ways. 
Although judges may begin to work with each other on an individual case 
when it is assigned to the panel, the decision-making process is part of a larger 
social system in which the judges’ ongoing relationships with each other operate. 
The rules, procedures, customs, and culture of the court create an institutional 
context or design, which structures the judges’ interactions in specific ways. The 
institutional design includes not only formal, written rules and published internal 
operating procedures, but also informal, often unwritten, norms and traditions.45 
The written rules may be available to the public, but there are many unwritten 
informal norms that guide the relationships behind the bench. 
In judges’ accounts of the way their courts work, they consider the effect that 
their communications are likely to have on their colleagues. For example, Justice 
Eva Guzman described methods of registering disagreement internally at the 
Supreme Court of Texas.46 Both Judges Diane Wood (7th Circuit) and Marsha 
 
 42.  EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 290.  
 43.  Kim, supra note 5, at 1325. 
 44.  Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization, 58 DUKE L.J. 1667, 1671 (2009) 
(citing Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges 
Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 29–43 (2007)). 
 45.  LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 18 (1997). 
 46.  Eva M. Guzman & Ed Duffy, The (Multiple) Paths of Dissent: Roles of Dissenting Judges in the 
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Berzon (9th Circuit) are careful with the tone and content of their internal 
memoranda wanting to encourage the majority writer to accommodate their 
suggestions.47 
These judges’ descriptions illustrate that they develop expectations about 
how they believe their colleagues will react before deciding how to proceed. This 
can be understood as a “strategic account” of judicial behavior as described by 
Lee Epstein and Jack Knight in “The Choices Justices Make.”48 Decisions of 
appellate judges on multimember courts are not made in isolation. There is a 
majority rule, and so in order to reach the result that a judge desires or believes 
is correct, the judge has to convince a majority of the other judges who have the 
ability to vote, to vote as they do. This means that the judge needs to consider the 
preferences and judicial philosophies of the other judges and have accurate 
expectations as to how the others will act.49 In order to have the collective 
decision be as close to a judge’s views as possible, the judge will have to think 
about what the others might do and act in accordance.50 
Forming accurate expectations about how other judges will act requires 
taking into account the rules of the relationships51 upon which the judges can rely 
in order to form their expectations. The rules must be well known and generally 
accepted—such as a rule requiring motorists to stop at red lights—so they can 
accurately predict what others will do: stop if the light turns red. In addition, each 
of the judges must believe that the others will comply with the rules; this depends 
on both information about the rules and whether there are sanctions for non-
compliance.52 Informal sanctions on a court can range from ostracism to refusal 
to interact cooperatively, to even outright rejection of decisions. 
Thus, the interactions between judges take place within a complex 
institutional framework, in which sets of rules structure their social interactions.53 
In accordance with this analysis, one would expect that the use of different rules 
and norms to structure the judges’ social interactions would affect the judicial 
decision-making process. This is, in part, because the strategic interactions and 
expectations of how the judges will act shape their choices and those interactions 
and expectations are themselves shaped by the institutional structure, rules, and 
norms. The Hettinger et al. study confirms that “[i]nstitutional context thus has 
a substantial impact on the likelihood that judges will express their disagreements 
in the form of dissenting opinions.”54 Another scholar also concluded that 
 
Judicial Process, 97 JUDICATURE 108 (2013).  
 47.  Wood, supra note 29, at 1465; Berzon, supra note 2.  
 48.  EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 45, at xiii.  
 49.  Id. at 79.  
 50.  See Jacobi & Kontorovich, supra note 26, at 190, for novel institutional explanations about why 
judges always vote and do not abstain. 
 51.  Id. at 115.  
 52.  A sanction is an action that increases costs and diminishes the benefits of non-compliance. Id. at 
117. 
 53.  Id. at 112.  
 54.  HETTINGER, supra note 1, at 111.  
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“[s]ome structures and procedures for decisionmaking reduce imperfections in 
decision processes more effectively than others. In the institutional design of 
courts, one goal should be to identify mechanisms that foster effective 
decisionmaking.”55 
Because each court can develop its own internal rules and norms, different 
courts can answer questions differently, such as which judges can vote on 
opinions, how the votes are made and communicated, whether votes can be 
changed, with whom there is discussion and the structure of such discussions, how 
cases are assigned to the judges to write majority opinions, and whether 
disagreement is expected or is unusual. Does it matter if these questions are 
answered differently? 
Judge Patricia Wald wrote that, when she joined the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court, she imagined that “conferences would be reflective, refining, 
analytic, dynamic. Ordinarily they are none of these.”56 Why was her experience 
different from the description of other judges, such as Judge Edwards? 
In addition to the factors on which studies of judicial behavior often focus as 
influencing a judge,57 judges are also affected by the institutional norms that 
structure the relationships of the judges with the other judges and staff on the 
court. Looking at judges like other workers, as Epstein, et al. suggest, the rules 
and unwritten norms that structure the environment and relationships at the 
place of employment will have a significant effect on how the workers do their 
jobs—and whether they enjoy their work and put in extra hours and effort or 
count the minutes until they can leave. This may be particularly true where, as 
with judges, there is no elasticity to salary and no real threat of job loss for federal 
judges, or within the elected term for state judges. Depending on the rules and 
norms, the conformity effect Epstein, et al. document could either reflect effort 
aversion, just going along to get along, or it may be the result of collaborative 
deliberation resulting in consensus. While there are different theories, and 
different experiences, it may not mean that only one is correct but that all are 
plausible when evaluating courts with different institutional structures. For 
example, expressing disagreement may be frowned upon in one court as 
undermining collegiality or creating additional costs and not in another.58 
Workload, as opposed to caseload,59 can also affect the ability of judges to 
 
 55.  Baum, supra note 44, at 1670–71. 
 56.  RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 2 n.5 (2008) (quoting Patricia M. Wald, Some Real-
Life Observations about Judging, 26 IND. L. REV. 173, 177 (1992)).  
 57.  Including legalistic factors, such as “constraints imposed by following rules, precedent, the 
reasoning and justificatory requirements of judicial opinion writing,” judicial temperament, judicial 
philosophy, and political ideology, or a workplace model of judicial behavior. Renée Cohn Jubelirer, The 
Behavior of Federal Judges: The “Careerist” in Robes, 97 JUDICATURE 98, 99 (2013).  
 58.  HETTINGER, supra note 1, at 39.  
 59.  Caseload is “an imperfect measure of workload because cases are not uniform with respect to 
the time and effort required to decide them.” EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 292.  
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internally or externally express disagreement with the opinions of their 
colleagues.60 
E. Looking Behind the Bench 
One of the difficulties in examining the question of how great an effect the 
institutional design of a court actually has on judicial decision-making is that, 
while the written rules of the courts are generally available to the public, the 
unwritten customs and norms are not easily discernible to those outside. 
Hettinger et al. describe informal norms as “notoriously slippery,” “difficult to 
define, much less measure.”61 Yet, in their study they found that “circuit-level” 
norms had an important influence on dissenting behavior.62 “Like many of the 
most interesting influences on behavior, norms are generally assumed to 
influence behavior, but they are difficult to measure empirically.”63 Because the 
interactions between the judges behind the bench are not observable outside of 
the court, those who wish to understand them have examined their reflections in 
the written opinions that are filed. For example, the frequency of dissenting 
opinions, i.e. dissent rates, have been used as “behavioral manifestations of 
decision-making norms operative at the circuit court level.”64 The decision is 
public; however, the internal deliberations of the panel usually are not.65 Thus, 
looking at panel composition effects may provide some reflection of internal 
interaction of the panel, even if such reflections are likely to be quite imperfect 
and incomplete. 
“[T]he better that judges are understood the more effective lawyers will be. . . 
[a]nd judges who understand their motivations and those of other judges are 
likely to be more effective judges.”66 Understanding how judges make decisions, 
including what influences them, is an important endeavor.67 The influence that 
judges may have on each other is at the heart of studying a multimember 
appellate court. Engaging in this endeavor as a sitting judge, as I have previously 
 
 60.  HETTINGER, supra note 1, at 40. See also Posner, supra note 56.  
 61.  HETTINGER, supra note 1, at 39.  
 62.  Id. at 111.  
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Releases of the notes of Justices of the United States Supreme Court have provided insight into 
their deliberations. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 45, for an example. However, courts do not 
typically release information about the deliberations contemporaneously with the decision. See also 
Edwards & Livermore, supra note 16, at 1903 (“[t]he deliberative process . . . cannot be observed by 
outsiders”). 
 66.  EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 6. See also Kem Thompson Frost, Predictability in the Law; Prized 
Yet Not Promoted, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 51, 65 (2015) (the how and the why of opinions is not easily 
observable from the cases). 
 67.  For examples, see Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and 
Information Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313, 1315 (2009); 
Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 (2004); Jay S. Bybee & 
Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Tournament, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1055 (2005); Scott Baker, et al., The 
Continuing Search for a Meaningful Model of Judicial Ranking and Why it (Unfortunately) Matters, 58 
DUKE L. J. 1645 (2009).  
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expressed, can be an “out of body experience.”68 Although aware of the general 
caution regarding the questionable veracity of judicial self-reporting, I believe 
judges benefit from studying this literature, and that judges can make a necessary 
and essential contribution to further understanding internal decision-making by 
virtue of their experience, knowledge, and observations. 
There is a growing trend of judges to look inward. For example, Justice 
Guzman cautioned studies, such as Epstein, et al., “fail[ed] to account for a broad 
range of judicial behavior, much of which is informal and occurs behind the 
scenes.”69 Underlying her critique of Epstein, et al.’s model is her understanding, 
by virtue of sitting on the Supreme Court of Texas, of the influence of an 
“unwritten dissent.”70 Judges Berzon, Wood, and Lipez have provided their 
insights based on their experiences as judges on their different courts. For 
example, Judge Berzon and her colleagues share bench memos before argument; 
however, she notes that the “ultimate dispositions often bear little resemblance 
to these memoranda—an indication that the adversarial collaboration process 
does work, in the long run, to improve the final opinion.”71 Judge Pryor examined 
the way his court internally addresses whether to rehear an appeal en banc, 
explaining how and why it can change his mind.72 Judge Lipez described the 
decision to grant reconsideration of an issued opinion on his court as “your own 
colleagues undoing your work. There is no minimizing the unpleasantness of this 
phenomenon, which . . . can be the most divisive event in the life of a court of 
appeals.”73 
Thus, judges may be in a better position to discover whether the norms of an 
appellate court affect not only the way the judges relate each to other, but also 
their joint decision-making. If the norms influence the communication of 
disagreement, they may also affect how disagreement is structured, how 
consensus is developed, and the effectiveness of the group process through which 
the judges make decisions. As Judge Berzon perceptively states, when her court 
cannot arrive at consensus, she does “not regard such a result as a failure of the 
collaborative process but rather as integral to its functioning.”74 
Like these judges, I will look inward at the intermediate appellate court upon 
which I sit, examining its rules and norms, where they came from, how they 
structure communications and address disagreement, and how the judges 
 
 68.  Cohn Jubelirer, supra note 57, at 98–99.  
 69.  Guzman & Duffy, supra note 46, at 108. For example, dissenting judges can help narrow the 
scope of the issues addressed in per curiam, unsigned opinions issued without oral argument. 
 70.  Id. See also Belleau & Johnson, supra note 17, at 169 (describing the “invisible dissent”). 
 71.  Berzon, supra note 2, at 1486 n.37. 
 72.  Pryor, supra note 23, at 1019–1021. 
 73.  Kermit V. Lipez, To Lobby or Not to Lobby: That is an Important Question, 31 ME. B.J. 18, 19 
(2017). 
 74.  Berzon, supra note 2, at 1487. This view is not universal. Chief Justice John Roberts of the U.S. 
Supreme Court said he believes dissenting opinions are a symptom of dysfunction. Wood, supra note 29, 
at 1450 n.27 (citing M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of 
Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 283 nn.1–2 (2007)). 
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perceive them to work. My goal is to identify rules and norms on the 
Commonwealth Court that might reduce costs of disagreement and, therefore, 
increase the likelihood that the judges will engage in a collegial, deliberative and 
collaborative decision-making process. 
III 
THE COMMONWEALTH COURT 
A. History and Design of the Commonwealth Court 
The institutional design of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, an 
intermediate appellate court, is unique. In its appellate jurisdiction, the 
Commonwealth Court hears appeals from decisions of the county courts and 
state administrative agencies. This court’s unique jurisdiction is based on both 
the subject matter of the issue and the identities of the parties. Thus, the court 
hears most, but not all, matters involving governmental bodies, including local 
civil service matters, eminent domain cases, negligence actions for damages 
against government entities, and zoning disputes, among others. Essentially, the 
court deals with administrative law, governmental law, and public law. The only 
other court in the country that has similar jurisdiction is the Federal D.C. Circuit, 
which deals with administrative agency appeals involving federal administrative 
agencies.75 
However, unlike most appellate courts, the Commonwealth Court has 
significant original jurisdiction, approximately 18-20% of its cases. In these 
matters, the judges make decisions individually as trial court judges. Actions by 
and against the Commonwealth government generally commence in 
Commonwealth Court, except where money damages are sought. The court hears 
all challenges to state government policies in its original jurisdiction. The court 
also considers election issues involving candidates for local, state, and national 
office, with challenges to state and national office falling within its original 
jurisdiction. The court recently made news when a judge in our original 
jurisdiction heard a controversial case about gerrymandering.76 
After constitutional amendment created the Commonwealth Court in 1968, 
the Governor appointed the seven original judges who had to be confirmed by 
the Senate in 1970. Four nominees were Republicans and three were Democrats. 
They each had political experience and understanding. The first President Judge, 
James S. Bowman, had been a member of the state House of Representatives and 
a trial court judge in Dauphin County, home of the state capital, before his 
appointment. The other judges gave the court geographical diversity and 
 
 75.  See Baum, supra note 44, at 1674, for a discussion of the effects of judicial specialization on 
judicial behavior in courts, of which the Commonwealth Court is one. He argues that the immersion of 
judges in specific fields can have powerful effects on judicial decisions. Id. (citing David W. Craig, The 
Court for Appeals—and Trials—of Public Issues: The First 25 Years of Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth 
Court, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 321, 323 (1995)). Baum describes the public law jurisdiction of the 
Commonwealth Court as considerably broader than other more specialized courts.  
 76.  See e.g., League of Women Voters v. Wolf, 177 A 3d. 1000, 177 A.3d. 1010 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).  
COHN JUBELIRER - BOOK PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/9/2019  5:04 PM 
No. 2 2019] COMMUNICATING DISAGREEMENT BEHIND THE BENCH 117 
additional legal and political experience with a former law school dean, district 
attorney, state representative, and trial court judges. All the judges “had 
additional public sector background suitable to the court’s mission.”77 The 
original judges were World War II veterans, and their military experience was 
evident in their work ethic and their respect for the President Judge.78 The court 
originally sat en banc (all together) and heard arguments for every case brought 
to the court. When the workload increased, the legislature added two more 
commissioned judges, for a total of nine commissioned judges, where it remains 
today, and the court began hearing cases in three-judge panels.79 As the workload 
grew, senior judges assisted the court, which allowed the size of the Court to 
remain at nine commissioned judges. Similar to judges on other courts, the 
original judges had to grapple with two issues: 1) “When the citizens have elected 
an appellate body to bring collective wisdom to deciding cases, how can all the 
judges participate in every appeal in a populous state?”; and 2) how to “ensure 
that the decisions of panels, when issued, are not in conflict with each other.”80 
The judges met this challenge by adopting innovative internal operating 
procedures very similar to the current ones. 
After the appointment of the original judges, all judges since have run for 
election. Since 1986, the constitution requires Pennsylvania appellate court 
judges to initially run in contested partisan elections and then stand for a “yes or 
no” retention vote every ten years. When a judge reaches the age of 75, under 
the Pennsylvania Constitution, the judge must retire from commissioned status 
but may continue to serve as a senior judge upon appointment by the Supreme 
Court. 
B. How the Rules and Norms Structure the Interactions Between the Judges 
From my interviews with commissioned judges, and reviewing the 
reminiscences of former judges,81 specific rules and norms are particularly, and 
consistently, important to the judges and their work. They structure how judges 
communicate different points of view, both internally within the court, and 
externally to the public, while providing a work environment within which the 
institutional structure operates. 
Internal communications are structured by the internal operating procedures, 
which are overlaid on what the judges refer to as a “tradition of constructive 
collegiality.”82 The procedures and tradition operate together synergistically, 
 
 77.  Craig, supra note 75, at 346.  
 78.  Reminiscences of Daniel Schuckers, Prothonotary, Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, at 8, 
available at http://pacchs.org/Reminiscences/REMINISCENCES%20-%20Dan%20Schuckers.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B4WE-Z6Z3] (last visited Feb. 26, 2019).  
 79.  Kim, supra note 5.  
 80.  Craig, supra note 75, at 337.  
 81.  See Oral Histories and Reminiscences, Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Historical Society, 
available at http://pacchs.org/oral_histories.html [https://perma.cc/G48C-JL5N] (last visited Feb. 26, 
2019). The author interviewed the judges of the court in 2014. 
 82.  Craig, supra note 75, at 367.  
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such that both are integral and essential to the deliberative process. The tradition 
of the court firmly requires both friendly respect between the judges, as well as 
the communication of honest disagreement.83 The judges expect their colleagues 
to communicate disagreement, and, because it is expected and everyone 
participates in the communication, any thin skins have to thicken. 
For clarity, this discussion of the relevant rules and norms is organized in 
chronological order, from case assignment until disposition, and not in order of 
importance. 
1. Case Assignment 
In general, cases are either submitted without argument to the court on the 
briefs and record made at the fact-finding tribunal (usually a trial court or 
administrative agency), or argued by the parties in front of a panel of judges. 
Cases that are submitted to a panel on briefs without argument are mechanically 
assigned by the chief clerk to a judge to draft a preliminary opinion. By rule, 
argued cases are assigned by the presiding judge, who is usually the most senior 
on the panel. By custom, the presiding judges do not assign all the interesting or 
controversial cases to themselves or make assignments based on subject matter. 
The presiding judge will assign a case to a panel judge that had any previous 
involvement with the case, such as hearing a preliminary motion. Otherwise, the 
assignment is random. Random assignment precludes the ability of the presiding 
judge to try to determine the outcome through the assignment and treats the 
other judges on the panel with consideration and respect.84 
2. Argued Cases 
Cases that are argued are assigned most often to a three-judge panel for 
argument; cases can also be directly assigned to be heard by the court en banc—
typically seven judges—for which arguments are televised in their entirety on the 
Pennsylvania Cable Network.85 Most judges circulate bench memos to each other 
in advance of argument. 
3. Voting 
Voting varies depending on whether the case is argued or submitted. After 
argument, the judges conference to discuss the cases and preliminarily vote on 
the outcome. The judges orally communicate their points of view and, when they 
differ, discuss their disagreements. The presiding judge assigns the case to a judge 
 
 83.  As Judge Craig wrote, “the court has developed unwritten traditions that are just as important 
and, indeed, so prevalent that observers outside of the court have recognized them.” Id. at 368. 
 84.  A study that evaluated opinion assignment on the federal courts of appeals found that “female 
and more liberal judges are substantially more likely to write opinions in sexual harassment cases,” which 
appears to result from “an institutional environment in which judges seek out opinions they wish to 
write.” Sean Farhang, Jonathan P. Kastellec & Gregory J. Wawro, The Politics of Opinion Assignment 
and Authorship on the US Court of Appeals: Evidence from Sexual Harassment Cases, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 
S59, S59 (2015). 
 85.  The televising of oral arguments can also publicly display different viewpoints of the judges on 
the panel. 
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to draft the opinion after the preliminary vote. Once the opinion is written, it is 
circulated to the full court for votes with a cover memo that sets out any concerns 
or disagreements with the majority position raised at the discussion after 
argument. When a case is submitted, a randomly assigned judge drafts an opinion 
and circulates it to the other two panel judges for a preliminary vote, or “PV.” 
The panel judges communicate their PV, which is generally either “agree” or 
“disagree,” along with any comments. If the opinion garners two votes of 
agreement, it can be circulated to the full court with a cover memo containing the 
communications of the panel judges and any response by the author. 
One of the most innovative aspects of the court’s Internal Operating 
Procedures (IOPs)86 is that every commissioned judge reads and votes on every 
opinion even if not on the panel, which has been referred to as “the full court 
press.”87 The judges on the panel can vote to join, concur, or dissent, and can 
write a minority opinion (concurrence or dissent). Non-panel judges can vote 
objection or no objection. 
Another innovation since I joined the bench is that votes are now cast on the 
court’s electronic case management system (PACMS), to which every chambers 
has access. All opinions are circulated in this system, which permits the judge to 
see the opinion, accompanying cover memo—which contains any preliminary 
votes and comments of the panel judges—and all votes that are entered after 
circulation, along with any comments of the voting judges.88 Judges receive 
notifications when votes are entered and can use PACMS any time to read votes 
or comments or input their votes and their comments. In this way, all judges 
communicate agreement, disagreement, suggestions, or compliments, internally, 
to the other judges. These internal, informal communications are structured by 
the IOPs. An informal comment in PACMS is quickest and easiest, and the 
comments can be as lengthy or short as needed to make the point. In addition, 
once one judge has expressed a point of view, the cost of the other judges can be 
reduced by just agreeing with that judge. 
The judges do not weigh heavily the feelings of the other judges when 
deciding whether to object, as long as there are honest intellectual differences. 
They feel it is important to communicate their differences so that the majority 
author and the other judges all have the benefit of their views. Because it is 
routine to see comments, it is considered part of the deliberative decision-making 
process. Judges do consider the other judges’ feelings with how they express their 
objection. There is a tradition of writing respectfully. Judges can also comment 
in a complimentary way, suggest that an opinion that is circulated as an 
unpublished memorandum opinion be re-designated for publication, or suggest 
additional authority to support a proposition of law. 
 
 86.  210 Pa. Code §§ 69.101–69.502. These procedures offer guidance and information to counsel and 
litigants as to the Court’s internal processes for matters before the Court.  
 87.  Craig, supra note 75, at 336–37. 
 88.  The briefs are also available on PACMS.  
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All of the judges read and consider the comments of the other judges and can 
change their votes or revise their opinions to address the comments—vote 
fluidity.89 The judges have varied backgrounds and prior legal experiences and 
expertise that they bring to bear. The judges understand that one reason that they 
invest the time and effort in voting on every case, commenting to the other 
judges, and reading the other judges’ comments is so that everyone’s views will 
be seriously considered. There is, therefore, an expectation that judges will 
change their vote if, upon consideration of a different view, they sincerely change 
their mind about the circulating opinion. There is no shame to this fluidity of 
voting—it means the process is working. Where the authoring judge wishes to 
modify the opinion in response to a comment, a revised opinion is circulated to 
the court with a cover memo explaining the changes. The tradition is that the 
memo always ends by thanking the judge who commented, and that the author 
looks forward to additional comments. The modification may not affect the 
outcome, in which case there is no need for a new vote, or it might affect the 
outcome, thus requiring a new vote; the author will then apologize for any 
inconvenience. 
In addition to commenting on opinions in PACMS, all judges can separately 
circulate formal memos to the other judges. Memos require more effort than a 
PACMS comment and, therefore, are not circulated as often. The memos will 
discuss the disagreement and usually cite facts and precedent to support a legal 
argument or discussion of the issues. It is possible that, because such memos are 
not usually circulated, and additional effort is involved in drafting them, they 
indicate a greater intensity of the disagreeing judge’s position and a greater 
confidence in that position. If the disagreeing judge is not on the panel, it may 
inspire panel members to rethink their position. 
The judges who sat on a panel have an additional opportunity for expressing 
their views because they can write dissenting or concurring opinions. Thus, they 
have the opportunity to express their disagreement to the public.90 In deciding 
whether to write and circulate a separate opinion, the judges will consider many 
factors. Although some judges might consider whether the majority opinion is 
reported or unreported, that is not determinative.91 One factor that is not 
considered is whether the authoring judge will be upset that a separate opinion is 
written. Judges that might be sensitive when they arrive at the court quickly see 
that all judges receive the constructive critique of their colleagues and so it is not 
personal. Thin skins must and do thicken. In part, this results from the respectful 
 
 89.  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 29, at 159. 
 90.  Berzon, supra note 2, at 1486–87.  
 91.  The IOPs list the factors to consider regarding whether opinions should be reported, such as 
whether the case adds to the development of the law, applies the law to a new factual situation, etc. As 
is customary in many courts, the majority of the cases are unreported, but both reported and unreported 
opinions “go to conference” for discussion. Currently, all opinions of the court are available online, and 
unreported opinions can be cited, not as precedential, but as persuasive authority. 210 Pa. Code § 69.414 
(2018). Thus, it is questionable whether any opinion is truly “unreported” but is, more accurately, not 
binding precedent. 
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tone of the critique or disagreement. Judges do not use separate opinions as an 
opportunity to be critical of another judge, and they try hard not to write to 
offend. The culture of the court is that the judges focus on the message and not 
the messenger and try not to take separate opinions personally. Moreover, if an 
opinion contains language that a judge finds offensive, whether the perceived 
offense be toward another judge, a litigant, or counsel, the judge can ask that the 
language be changed.92 The inclusion of any such language would presumably be 
unintentional, and the authoring judge would make the change. 
Judges often write at least a short dissent if they disagree rather than 
dissenting without opinion so that the parties know the reason for the dissent. 
The dissenting opinion may be more flexible and creative than a majority 
opinion. While a majority opinion expresses the opinion of the majority of the 
court, a dissenting opinion can express the individual viewpoint of the author, 
discuss reality outside the law, or explain why the current state of the law should 
be changed. 
The IOPs contain time constraints for voting, which are taken very seriously 
by the judges who do not wish to hold up their colleagues’ work. By tradition, the 
authoring judge will grant another judge’s request for an extension of time to 
vote or to circulate a separate opinion as a matter of courtesy. There is a sanction 
for noncompliance with the time constraints, which is that the majority writer can 
file the opinion without waiting for a separate opinion to be circulated or delayed 
vote to be cast. Although that sanction has not been used since I have been on 
the court, it was used in the past and, therefore, remains a credible incentive to 
voting and circulating separate opinions in a timely fashion. 
 
4. Judicial Conference 
A central feature of the deliberative process is our judicial conference. If four 
judges disagree with the majority opinion, the opinion cannot be filed, and the 
matter is sent to judicial conference, where all the judges gather and discuss those 
cases. Judicial conferences are held in person nine times a year during argument 
sessions.93 At conference, the judge who wrote the majority opinion speaks first 
and explains why the majority opinion is correct on the facts and the law. The 
other judges can, and do, ask questions about the factual record, the parties’ 
arguments, legal precedent, and reasoning. Then, if there is a dissent, the 
dissenting author explains why that opinion is correct, and, again, the judges can, 
and do, ask questions. If there was no dissenting opinion, the objecting judges 
explain their objections. There is a discussion during which any judge can speak 
without regard to seniority as many times as needed. At the end of the discussion, 
the president judge holds a vote, with the newest judge voting first.94 Depending 
 
 92.  During an interview, one judge described how former President Judge David Craig refused to 
allow the judges to say or write that there is “no merit” to an argument but instead should write that the 
party “did not prevail.” Author’s interview with Commonwealth Court Judge, 1/21/2014. 
 93.  Because of increased volume, the Court can have a video conference between sessions. 
 94.  In this way, the newer judges will not feel pressured by the votes of the more senior judges. 
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on the outcome, the opinion can be filed as written, reassigned to a different 
judge on the panel, withdrawn by the authoring judge to rewrite, or, if the vote 
of the panel judges is contrary to the vote of the commissioned judges, assigned 
to be submitted or argued to the court en banc. Although the judges will have 
already voted while the opinion was in circulation, they can change their votes at 
conference based on the questions, answers, and discussion, and any additional 
work the judges did to prepare for conference. The opinion writers can also 
change their position after the discussion. The discussions, while often quite 
animated, have remained respectful and collegial during my tenure (since 
January 2002). 
All the judges prepare for judicial conference, many as if for oral argument. 
Some judges strategize in their preparation. Prior to conference, a majority writer 
may think long and hard about whether to withdraw the opinion and rewrite 
when five or more judges voted in opposition to the majority opinion. The judges 
all felt that the effort costs are worth the benefits of conference.95 There is an 
expectation that disagreements will be honestly aired at a conference that is 
“always heated and wonderful,” where the judges “really care and battle it out.”96 
Minds are changed when knowledgeable judges participate in discussion, even 
though they were not on the panel. Because everyone participates, and has at 
different times been a majority writer as well as an objector or dissenter, it is not 
personal. Conference gives all the judges a voice in the decision, so everyone can 
be heard and then accept the decision. There is a sense that if some judges did 
not have input into the precedent, they might try to diminish it by distinguishing 
it in subsequent opinions. The goal is to allow the court to police itself to maintain 
consistency of precedent and development of the law. Judges listen to their 
colleagues and may change their minds. 
While the judges do have different judicial philosophies, the judges do not see 
political partisanship as influencing their colleagues’ decisions. The backgrounds 
and experiences of the judges affect the decisions; it is this diversity that is shared 
through voting and at conference. The composition of the court does not change 
often, and usually changes only incrementally. After reading the other judges’ 
opinions, reading their votes and comments, and deliberating and adversarially 
collaborating with them over a period of years, we become familiar with one 
another’s judicial philosophies and perspectives on legal issues. When writing 
opinions, the judges can, and many do, predict what another judge’s 
disagreement might be and try to write, if possible, to avoid it. It can also change 
the way we look at certain cases. One of my former colleagues had a particular 
point of view about Turner or Anders letters and briefs, which have to be filed 
when a public defender wishes to withdraw from representation. She articulated 
the position well; therefore, I did not have to focus on that issue. However, after 
 
 95.  Judge Craig in 1995 wrote that “[a]s a result of this court-wide scrutiny of every appellate 
decision, the [C]ommonwealth [C]ourt has received high marks in surveys of the legal profession for 
consistency in its appellate decisions, whether published or not.” Craig, supra note 75, at 339.  
 96.  Interview with Commonwealth Court Judge (January 21, 2014).  
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she left the court, I realized that, without consciously thinking about it, I was now 
examining those cases with her eyes and communicating her view to the others. 
We continue to hear the voices of colleagues after they have left the court, both 
within their opinions, as well as in our collective memories.97 
 
5. Other Norms 
The informal norms and our traditions have created an environment of 
friendship and respect in ways that might not specifically impact voting and the 
process of deciding cases but nonetheless benefit the decision-making process. 
There is a norm of equality, as seen in the way argued cases are assigned, and 
which is carried through to the president judge, who is elected every five years by 
the majority of the commissioned judges. The best president judge is one who 
sees all the judges as equals and does what is right for the court without an 
agenda. During my tenure, the president judge has submitted important 
administrative questions to the judges at our judicial conferences and asked for 
the judges to vote on them rather than deciding these issues alone. 
Another tradition is the willingness of every judge to help the other judges 
with their work. For example, every judge will fill in whenever necessary for a 
judge who is unable to hear a case, whether because of illness, recusal, or family 
emergency. Even in the midst of disagreement, the judges help each other. There 
is a custom that, when an opinion is reassigned from the judge who wrote the 
original majority to a dissenting judge to write a new majority opinion, the 
dissenting judge may use any of the text from the original majority opinion. It is 
customary to internally thank the original judge when circulating the new 
majority opinion, but there is no external attribution. 
The importance of court staff and law clerks in the institutional structure of a 
court may also vary. The Commonwealth Court has staff that is extremely 
knowledgeable, with the former and current prothonotaries, the former 
executive administrator, and a former law clerk of the Court being the authors of 
the recognized treatise on Pennsylvania Appellate Procedure.98 Attorneys and 
pro se litigants can call the court and get friendly help (of course, not legal advice) 
in filing their documents. Judges will typically try to hire the staff of departing 
judges, if possible, so that staff can remain part of the court family. In 2007, 
through the efforts of then-President Judge Bonnie Brigance Leadbetter and 
 
 97.  We can also hear their voices through their law clerks, who often continue to work for the court 
in the chambers of other judges. During my tenure on the court, I have hired three law clerks who 
previously worked for different colleagues. The study of the role of law clerks is an area that needs to be 
explored more fully. Every chambers is different in terms of the process of drafting opinions, who reviews 
them, what input the clerks have, whether there are career clerks, and how disagreement is resolved. 
There is an opportunity to obtain diversity of opinion from hiring law clerks with diverse backgrounds 
and experiences which can, depending on whether law clerks are encouraged to critique opinions, also 
provide some amelioration of bias. See Donald Molloy, Designated Hitters, Pinch Hitters, and Bat Boys: 
Judges Dealing with Judgment and Inexperience, Career Clerks or Term Clerks, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. No. 2, 2019 at 133.  
 98.  RONALD DARLINGTON, MATTHEW MCKEON, DANIEL SCHUCKERS & KRISTEN BROWN, 
PENNSYLVANIA APPELLATE PRACTICE (2013).  
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retiring Prothonotary Dan Schuckers, the Commonwealth Court Historical 
Society (CCHS) was created as a non-profit corporation. The CCHS sponsors 
continuing legal education programs and dinners and hosted a 40th anniversary 
celebration that included a symposium at Widener Law School and a two-volume 
edition of the Widener Law Journal devoted to scholarly articles about the 
jurisdiction of the court and the development of its precedent over the last 40 
years.99 The judges participate in the educational programs, which also have a 
social component to them and foster pride in the Court. 
Because it is a court of statewide jurisdiction, the judges have home chambers 
throughout the Commonwealth in the communities in which they live. Therefore, 
most communication is through the comments in PACMS, memos, and written 
opinions or bench memos, a type of virtual conversation, in addition to email and, 
less frequently, phone calls. However, when the court comes together at 
argument sessions nine times a year, the judges join in person for judicial 
conference, socializing, and dining together, encouraging and fostering the 
collegiality on which the court was initially founded. It is perhaps because the 
judges work throughout the Commonwealth that they appreciate the opportunity 
for in-person collaboration and decision-making. 
C. The Effect of the Rules and Norms on Decision-making 
Why might these norms increase the benefits of decision-making? Judicial 
and democratic decisions have much in common. Argument, including group 
discussion, and voting are the two primary mechanisms for both judicial and 
democratic decisions.100 As in democratic institutions, in which there is a need to 
constrain or minimize self-interest and maximize promoting the public good, 
judicial institutions must also constrain or minimize the self-interest of the 
decision makers to promote public confidence in the rule of law. As 
knowledgeable as they are, judges on a multimember court are to consider the 
views of the other members. In order to honestly consider other views, judges 
have to recognize that they do not have all the answers. Variously described as 
“judicial modesty,”101 “a stiff dose of epistemic humility,”102 and “recogniz[ing] 
their own fallibility,”103 this is a critical component of judicial temperament. 
Although there are effort costs involved, the collective decision-making process 
works where judges believe that, through the communication and consideration 
of divergent views, it will be possible to reduce bias and arrive at an accurate and 
consistent decision. This describes not only judicial decision-making, but also the 
pragmatic approach of structuring terms of persistent disagreement in a 
 
 99.  See 20–21 WIDENER L. REV. (2011).  A 50th anniversary celebration is being planned for 2020. 
 100.  JACK KNIGHT & JAMES JOHNSON, THE PRIORITY OF DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (2011).  
 101.  Pryor, supra note 23, at 1015. 
 102.  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 29, at 163. 
 103.  Lipez, supra note 73, at 20. The term “collegiality” descends from the Latin “collegium” meaning 
“‘body of colleagues or coworkers’ engaged in a shared enterprise. . . . respect[ing] each other’s positions, 
recognize[ing] their own fallibility, and [ ] open to persuasion.” Id. (citing Edwards, supra note 7).  
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democratic institution. Focusing on the value of diversity in decision-making, 
there are three commitments that are central to democratic pragmatism: first, 
fallibilism, which requires that the decision-makers know they do not have all the 
answers and be willing to engage in debate and argument to find the answers; 
second, anti-skepticism, which requires that the decision-makers believe that 
there is a possibility of achieving a correct decision; and third, consequentialism, 
which requires that the decision-makers consider the consequences of their 
decisions on future activities.104 This pragmatic approach is consistent with a 
collegial deliberative process and adversarial collaboration in judicial decision-
making, which presumes the following: judges realize that they are not always 
right, and that their views must be challenged—that they are fallible; that it is 
possible to reach a correct decision, a commitment to anti-skepticism; and that 
the consequences of this process, which “increase the opportunity for diverse 
voices to be heard,”105 also increase the probability of a decision that will be 
legitimate. For these reasons, a pragmatic judge could value engaging in the 
adversarial collaborative process of collegial decision-making even if at greater 
cost or effort. 
The rules and norms of the Commonwealth Court appear to have created a 
balance where judges honestly participate in a collegial deliberative and 
adversarial collaborative process giving effect to the assumptions on which 
appellate decision-making rests. There are arguments that this facilitates better 
decisions and promotes the values of democratic pragmatic decision-making. 
Importantly, the judges’ expression of disagreement is encouraged and 
structured in ways that permit a sliding scale of effort that relates to the 
importance of the disagreement to each judge. The main investment of time and 
effort is that every judge reads and votes on every opinion. However, the judges 
all believe that the effort to do this is worth the benefit to the legal precedent of 
the Court. The easiest expression of disagreement is through a short comment or 
objection in PACMS, which can take very little time and effort. This comment 
reaches the authoring judge and other judges who may agree with the objection. 
If objecting judges wish to invest more effort, because the issue is important to 
them, or they have high levels of self-confidence in their position,106 they can write 
a longer comment, a formal memo to the court, or, if the judge was on the panel, 
a separate opinion. Even if one judge does not want to invest the time and effort, 
another judge might. Because all the judges do regularly express their different 
opinions, the court encourages the “adversaries” necessary for the process to 
work.107 Moreover, because all the judges participate, and regularly object to 
 
 104.  KNIGHT & JOHNSON, supra note 100. 
 105.  Id. at 45. 
 106.  Voting, when sincere, reflects a judges’ view but not necessarily their confidence level. Where 
there is interdependent voting, the other judges should also know the confidence level, as it is “highly 
informative.” Posner & Vermeule, supra note 29, at 181. Confidence levels are communicated to the 
other judges through the sliding scale of effort, in addition to the opportunity to discuss the different 
points of view at conference. 
 107.  Berzon, supra note 2. 
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other opinions, the judges understand the process and do not take it personally. 
Structuring so many opportunities for adversarial collaboration behind the bench 
can reduce the costs of public dissensus, such as the risks of politicizing the court 
and creating indeterminacy in the law because those risks are actualized only by 
the expression of dissensus outside of the court. Additionally, the need to write a 
dissenting opinion as leverage to assure the objecting viewpoint is taken seriously 
is reduced because objections and comments are seriously considered. 
The two-tiered voting process contributes to the resolution of differences 
between the judges.108 Because the judges see each other’s votes on all cases all 
the time, after years of reading the opinions and comments and hearing 
conference discussions, the judges become very familiar with how the other 
judges think. Therefore, even before circulating a proposed opinion, judges may 
be able to predict the concerns of their colleagues and how they will vote, thereby 
providing the opportunity, prior to circulation, to moderate any ideological or 
other influence in the judge’s opinion independent of the panel composition. In 
addition, the perspectives of the other judges, over time, may become 
internalized within the judge. With our two-tiered approach to voting, the 
decision may benefit from the diversity of a small panel, while the court’s 
jurisprudence benefits from the consistency and measured developments of legal 
precedent provided by the oversight of the full court.109 This aspect of our 
institutional design should enable “outcomes across rotating panels[]sufficiently 
consistent to promote predictability.”110 
Because disagreement is expected, encouraged, and all judges engage in it, 
judges do not take such disagreement personally. And, because it is respectful 
and occurs within the court’s structure, disagreement does not affect judicial 
relationships. Moreover, the expectation that all judges will object and critically 
comment about circulating opinions eventually thickens the skins of any thin-
skinned judges on the court. Because everyone is treated equally, I have not seen, 
nor have any of the judges commented about, tension among the members of the 
court based on disagreement. Vote fluidity is expected, and there is no loss of 
face in changing one’s vote; there would be little purpose to deliberation if votes 
could not change. 
 
 108.  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 29. Eric Posner and Vermeule argue for a two-stage voting 
procedure in which all judges vote in the first stage, and in the second stage, the judges may change their 
votes depending on what they learned. This strict two-stage procedure may help reduce “free rider” 
concerns, where judges rely on the efforts of the other judges, a form of effort aversion. This is a potential 
issue with the Commonwealth Court process of interdependent voting, as judges can see each other’s 
votes in PACMS. There are also some efficiencies from allowing the judges to see each other’s votes, in 
situations where judges have imperfect information, as it allows for efficient information gathering and 
processing (such as sharing bench memos). I believe judges’ concerns about their reputations with their 
colleagues limit excessive free riding. 
 109.  For example, see EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 45, at 88–89 (describing how if Justice Burger 
had been trying to get the court to dismiss Craig v Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), on standing grounds; on a 
three-person court, he might have succeeded).  
 110.  HETTINGER, supra note 1, at 116. 
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A recent study, in examining whether judges should take into account the 
votes of colleagues in making their vote, argued “for a presumption that judges 
not only may, but should consider the votes of other judges as relevant evidence 
or information, unless special circumstances make the systemic costs of doing so 
clearly greater than the benefits . . . . Interdependence should be the norm. . . .”111 
Interdependence is the norm on the Commonwealth Court. I note with interest 
that this study particularly focused on public law,112 which is the jurisdiction of 
the Commonwealth Court. Our judges can incorporate our colleagues’ points of 
view in their decisions, which also causes no loss of face. Instead, there is 
appreciation for considering the votes of the other judges. 
A recent survey of federal judges concerning their approach to statutory 
interpretation found two factors, the judges’ generation and whether they had 
previous experience on Capitol Hill, to be more important than any ideological 
affiliation as conservative or liberal.113 The survey also found that D.C. Circuit 
judges were in “a category of their own.”114 The Commonwealth Court engages 
in significant statutory construction and has a jurisdiction similar to the D.C. 
Circuit. In my interviews, my colleagues similarly stated that they believed that 
the background of the other judges in state or local government or private 
practice had more effect on their points of view than political or ideological 
affiliation. The federal judges surveyed “acknowledged the need for 
pragmatism,” and as such, engaged in a form of “intentional eclecticism” because 
they were willing to consider many different kinds of arguments and evidence.115 
The judges defended this approach as “the only democratically legitimate” 
approach. From the interviews and my experience, it appears that the judges on 
the Commonwealth Court keep an open mind, read the comments and objections 
of the other judges, and place a high value on judicial conference discussions. 
The rules and norms of the court have created a pragmatic approach that 
structures the terms of disagreement as defined by Knight and Johnson.116 The 
three values of pragmatism appear to be present. First, the judges on the court 
realize that they are not always right and that their beliefs must be challenged 
through full-court voting and conference; in other words that they are fallible. 
Thus, changing one’s mind is not shameful for a pragmatic judge, but an accepted 
expression of fallibility. Second, the judges believe it is possible to arrive at the 
best decision through the expression of diverse ideas, a commitment to anti-
skepticism. Judges would not sincerely participate in the two-tiered process of 
 
 111.  Posner & Vermeule, supra note 29, at 159, 162. Moreover, “a judge in the minority may change 
her vote, and should change her vote, unless she has significant self-confidence or can cite other 
institutional considerations.” Id. at 176. 
 112.  “Public law,” refers to the extent of judicial deference to administrative agency rules and actions, 
immunity, statutory construction, among others. Id.  
 113.  Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-
Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1303 (March 2018). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 1300. 
 116.  KNIGHT & JOHNSON, supra note 100.  
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voting and conference if they did not believe that it would lead to a better 
decision. Finally, the judges understand that the consequences of this process, 
which “increase[s] the opportunity for diverse voices to be heard,”117 also 
increases the probability of a decision that will be legitimate. The commitment to 
consequentialism inspires the judges to spend the additional effort, reading and 
voting on every opinion and preparing for conference as if for an oral argument, 
in order to achieve consistency and institutional legitimacy. 
My interviews and the history of the court reveals that these procedures for 
doing our work were not created by or for the effort averse or the leisure-seekers. 
Rather, it is possible that the judges derive a non-monetary satisfaction from their 
work environment, which outweighs the leisure preference. Given the effect that 
a court’s rules and norms can have on judicial decision-making, it is also plausible 
that the differences in experiences that Judges Posner and Edwards describe 
could be the result of different rules and norms on their courts. A pragmatic judge 
may find a value in engaging in the adversarial, yet collegial and collaborative 
process of decision-making, even if at greater cost or effort. Perhaps the theories 
of both Judges Posner and Edwards can be understood together when explained 
this way: in a judicial utility model, a rational, pragmatic judge can be motivated 
to invest additional effort in decision-making within the institutional norms of a 
multimember court given the right incentives, rules, and norms. The institutional 
structure of the Commonwealth Court provides support for that proposition. 
That the dissent rates of the Commonwealth Court are no different than the 
dissent rates of other courts, even though the expression of true disagreement is 
encouraged and often occurs, supports the finding that the internal process of 
deliberating can help to reduce differences. 
D. Empirical Data 
To test my observations of the effect of the Commonwealth Court’s rules and 
norms on decision-making, I studied a subset of cases issued by the court. I 
expected that, because all judges vote, I would not see panel composition effects 
and, because of collaboration and vote fluidity, I would not see higher dissent 
rates even though there is considerable communication of different views. 
I reviewed appeals from the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) 
during 2007. During 2007, the commissioned judges were four Republicans and 
five Democrats, and there were three Democrat senior judges appointed by the 
Supreme Court, who could sit on panels but not en banc. In workers’ 
compensation, decisions are generally in favor of either injured employees, called 
claimants, or employers or their insurers. The typical method of testing theories 
is to examine the impact of ideology, or a proxy for ideology, in order to measure 
diversity of the judges and their likelihood of disagreement. Although, like Judge 
Berzon, I have concerns about this methodology, I used the party from which the 
judge was elected to the bench as a proxy for ideology—Democrat (D) and 
 
 117.  Id. at 45. 
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Republican (R)—and assumed rather simplistically that a Democrat will have a 
preference for the injured employee-claimant, and a Republican will have a 
preference for the employer-insurer, although I have no reason to think this is 
true. 
I examined these cases to see whether the employer or claimant was 
successful in the appeal, who the moving party was (the appellant-petitioner will 
have the greater burden and is always less likely to be successful on appeal), and 
the panel composition in terms of Republican or Democrat. The hypothesis is 
that because of the oversight of the full court before opinions can be filed, panel 
effects will be eliminated or reduced and the decisions of panels will not deviate 
based on composition. 
I studied 304 workers’ compensation opinions of the court, in which there 
were 298 panel decisions and 6 en banc opinions. The three-judge panels were 
comprised of either all Ds, 2 Ds and 1 R, or 2 Rs and 1 D. The three-judge panels 
can have at most 1 senior judge sitting with 2 currently-commissioned judges. 
Claimants who were unsuccessful in front of the Board appealed in greater 
numbers than did unsuccessful employers. Of the 304 cases, 228 were claimant 
appeals, while 76 were employer appeals. It is always harder to prevail as an 
appellant or petitioner, so I would expect a high percentage of affirmances, which 
I found. Considering anything less than a full affirmance as a victory, at least in 
part, for the appellant-petitioner, 249 or 82% were affirmed, and 55 or 18% were 
reversed. Out of 228 claimant appeals, there were 185 affirmances, and 43 
reversals, including en banc decisions. 
Table 1 illustrates the three-judge panels. As shown, in all D panels 78% of 
claimant appeals were affirmed, while 22%, were reversed, and 100% of 
employer appeals were affirmed, with no dissenting opinions.118 In 2D 1R panels, 
84% of claimant appeals were affirmed, while 16%, were reversed, and 84% of 
employer appeals were affirmed, while 16% were reversed. In 1D 2R panels, 
79.5% of claimant appeals were affirmed, while 20.5%, were reversed, and 78% 
of employer appeals were affirmed, while 22% were reversed. 
 
 118.  Note that claimants’ attorneys typically receive a percentage of the weekly compensation 
payment, while employers typically have a different calculation of legal costs. Claimants can recover costs 
under certain circumstances. This may affect the number of appeals from each group, and the confidence 
required for employers to appeal. 
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The results support that there are no real panel composition effects based on 
political party. The affirmance rates in favor of an employer in all D panels was 
78%, while it was 79.5% in 1D 2R panels. Similarly, the reversal rate in favor of 
a claimant was 22% in all D panels, while it was 20.5% in 1D 2R panels. Further 
study of larger numbers is needed to determine whether the affirmance in favor 
of claimants of 100% in all D panel and affirmance rate of 78% in favor of 
claimants in 1D 2R panels is statistically significant because only 39 appeals were 
filed by claimants, and so the number of reversals was only four. 
The en banc panels are different because, for these cases, seven commissioned 
judges sit on the panel. There were six en banc workers’ compensation cases, all 
filed by claimants; three were affirmed and three reversed. These cases tell an 
interesting story. Of the six, three began as cases submitted to a panel, while three 
were originally listed for en banc argument. Typically, a case will go to en banc 
consideration after being assigned to a panel when there is disagreement between 
the panel and the majority of commissioned judges per the IOPs. A panel 
majority, which could file the opinion on another court, cannot on our court if it 
is not consistent with the majority vote of the court. After the case is either 
submitted or argued to the en banc panel, there is another post-argument 
conference to vote on the outcome. There is no prohibition about changing the 
vote that originally compelled the case to en banc consideration. In fact, if the 
objecting judges change their minds, an opinion that went to conference can be 
filed as unanimous. A sophisticated litigant will be able to see a reflection of this 
because the case will initially have been ordered submitted to a panel on briefs 
without argument—or argued before a three-judge panel—and after a period of 
time, there will be a subsequent order setting an argument before the court en 
banc. The parties will also see that it is a unanimous opinion, and, if they are 
familiar with the IOPs, they will suspect that there was an initial disagreement 
among the judges—although it is also possible that judges will request en banc 
argument after reviewing the briefs if they believe the issues warrant it. However, 
even if they suspect disagreement, they will not know whether the former 
majority or former dissenting opinion prevailed. 
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Table 2 illustrates en banc panels. Of the six en banc opinions, four had 
dissenting opinions. This is a rate of 67%, although the sample size is too small 
to enable a statistically significant inference to be drawn.119 The panels were 
composed as follows. 
 The rate of separate opinions varied from 11.5% in 2004 to 7% in 2007. In the 
data analyzed by Hettinger et al., they found that the rate of separate opinions 
on the U.S. Court of Appeals was “low, averaging about 13% percent across the 
years” they studied, with substantial variation ranging from 2% to 41%.120 The 
rates on the Commonwealth Court are low, certainly less than the average of the 
federal courts. This is notable because, even though expressing disagreement is 
encouraged, the public expression of dissensus in separate opinions is no greater 
than the average on the federal appellate courts.121 
III 
CONCLUSION 
My analysis supports that understanding the reality of judicial decision-
making on a multimember court requires knowledge of the institutional context 
within which the judges work on that particular court. Each court has its own 
 
 119.  See EPSTEIN, supra note 22, at 269 (sample of seven en banc cases was too small in their study, 
although the dissent rate for all en banc cases in the federal courts of appeal during 2005–2010 was 77%).  
 120.  HETTINGER, supra note 1, at 110.  
 121.  Moreover, I note that, per Epstein et al., the likelihood of disagreement grows with the size of 
the panel, and thus is more likely to have dissents on the U.S. Supreme Court because there are nine 
judges as opposed to panels of three. However, although the panel size is usually three judges, because 
all the commissioned judges read and vote, the likelihood of disagreement should also grow. EPSTEIN, 
supra note 22, at 267.  
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unique institutional context, which is created by the court’s formal rules, informal 
norms, the judges’ interpretation of the rules and norms, and the work 
environment that they create. Because so much of the decision-making process 
occurs behind the bench within the institutional context, it may be difficult for 
people outside of a court to see more than the external reflection of that process 
in published opinions. 
The benefits of adversarial collaboration and a collegial deliberative decision-
making process on a multimember appellate court are that consideration of a 
diversity of opinions of a group of decision-makers is more likely to lead to more 
consistent and accurate decisions that are less likely to be biased. However, for 
the benefits to be realized, the group of decision-makers must be willing to 
express disagreement and listen to and consider the different opinions of others. 
Both the expression of disagreement and consideration of other perspectives 
have effort costs, and the filing of separate opinions can also create costs to the 
legal system. Studies of other courts have shown the likelihood that not all courts 
have judges who consistently engage in either a collegial deliberative process or 
an adversarial collaborative process of decision-making. Thus, those courts may 
not realize all of the benefits that they could from the multimember group 
decision-making process. I believe that the unique institutional structure of the 
Commonwealth Court has created an adversarial collaborative yet collegial 
process that does realize the benefits of a multimember group decision-making 
process, while reducing the effort and systemic costs of this process and thus 
fostering effective decision-making.122 If more judges look within their courts, 
there may be other rules and norms that can change the balance of the costs and 
benefits of appellate decision-making. 
 
 
 122.  I note that the size of the Commonwealth Court is optimal—nine judges was considered the 
“maximum feasible size” of an appellate court. See Cross, supra note 16, at 1403 (citing J. Woodford 
Howard, Jr., Recommendations of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Courts of Appeals in the Federal 
Judicial System 213 (1981)).  
